Anyway, enough “dear journal”, I really have to quote these few sentences from Thomas Metzinger’s book, Being No One. While they do build on a lot of what he has written up to that point (starting with definitions of “transparency”, said constraints, “representation” and “phenomenal experience”), they’re utterly brilliant on their own as well, I think, and a big stepping stone for tackling the problem known as the hard problem of consciousness.

[...] If all other necessary and sufficient constraints for the emergence of phenomenal experience are satisfied by a given representational system, the addition of a transparent self-model will by necessity lead to the emergence of a phenomenal self. Phenomenal selfhood results from autoepistemic closure in a self-representing system; it is a lack of information. The prereflexive, preattentive experience of being someone results directly from the contents of the currently active self-model being transparent. [...] Under a general principle of ontological parsimony it is not necessary (or rational) to assume the existence of selves, because as theoretical entities they fulfill no indispensable explanatory function. What exists are information-processing systems engaged in the transparent process of phenomenal self-modelling. All that can be explained by the phenomenological notion of a “self” can also be explained using the representationalist notion of a transparent self-model.

Really, just brilliant.

(I do hope that this falls under fair use in the context of scientific research, if the quotation is too expansive please notify me and I will remove it, or narrow it down further, immediately.)

But, phenomenologists have a point: There are things science just can’t explain (yet?), and often, when trying to incorporate science (or rather, the scientific methods) and the way we have subjective intentionality, philosophers of mind either didn’t bring forth an entirely convincing argument or invented terms like supervenience or epiphenomenalism that essentially say “we don’t know how exactly, but it just happens”.

That didn’t satisfy me. So I went to write a paper of my own about the subject:

The Legitimation of Traditional Phenomenology in a Rational-Causalist World

From the Abstract:

Traditional phenomenology has both gained new followers and new opponents in the last years. Followers, because it can explain things other approaches (like neurophysiology, or even psychology) can’t. Opponents, because it is dualist in nature and not really compatible with the way our science these days operates.

I will, in this short paper, attempt to show up how the good and important findings of traditional phenomenology can be incorporated in our rational-causalist world view, while at the same time avoiding to commit to its controversial parts. I will also show why I choose this approach and not one starting with traditional phenomenology.

To that end, I will attempt to single out two fundamental dogmas of phenomenology – that mental objects are immaterial, and that mental objects are (or can be) directed at physical entities – and show in what way altering those changes the entire theory that’s built upon them, enabling a reading of phenomenology that takes its contents serious and at the same time is compatible with a rational-causalist world view.

I did hand in the paper already, and I’m really looking forward to discussing it with the Professor later this month.

Keep in mind that I’m still merely a student working on his Diploma thesis (equivalent to Master under Bologna), so I’m sure I still have lots to learn Particularly the whole subjectivity issue isn’t quite solved yet.

Also, thanks to Prof. Marbach for this opportunity and an always open ear, Ste for the feedback during the writing of this paper, and to my wife Arzo for her awesome support.

Update 08-11-13, 15:52: Gee, I just had the first part (originally meant to be the whole) of some kind of a review discussion with Prof. Marbach, and I realized I misunderstood quite a few things about phenomenology, while I was not entirely clear on quite a few points in the paper, too, and actually have some things in there that border being factual errors. It’s great that I see those now, the idea that I could was one of the main things that drove me when writing the paper and putting forth such a controversial point. But take this as a word of caution – even less than I thought in this work here can be taken at face value, and I’ll revise quite a few points for my diploma thesis.